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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE ZEESE and EMILY 
ZEESE, his wife,
 Plaintms.AvpeiianU} 
ESTATE OF MAX SIEGEL; DAN 
SIEGEL, EVA SIEGEL, and \
 C a s e N o 
WESLEY D. WEBB, a partnership ) ,
 q o 7 0 ' 
d-b-a Patton's Travelers; TRAILER 
MART, INC., a Nevada corporation \ 
d-b-a Dan's Campers N' Trailers; and 
HUSKY OIL COMPANY OF 
DELAWARE, a Delaware corporation 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
GEORGE ZEESE and EMILY ZEESE 
NATURE OF T H E CASE 
This is an action in unlawful detainer brought by 
the plaintiffs-appellants on the grounds that: 1) the 
option to extend the lease in question was not exer-
cised, and 2) if the option were exercised, the defend-
1 
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ants-respondents have breached the restrictive use cov-
enants contained therein. Plaintiffs-appellants will here-
inafter be referred to as plaintiffs, and defendants-re-
spondents will hereinafter be referred to as defendants. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
The District Court divided the trial of plaintiffs' 
causes of action into 1) the issue of liability, and 2) the 
issue of damages. After presentation of the facts con-
cerning defendants' liability, the District Court entered 
judgment dismissing plaintiffs' causes of action, and 
denied plaintiffs' motion to amend findings and alter 
judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs George and Emily Zeese seek a re-
versal of the judgment of the District Court; an order 
requiring all defendants to vacate the premises in 
question; a remand to the District Court for a deter-
mination of the damages suffered by the plaintiffs; and 
a dismissal of defendants' counterclaims. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
On February 7, 1956, George and Emily Zeese 
acquired as joint tenants from the Elizabeth Ann 
2 
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Watts Estate approximately three and one half acres 
of land located at 6240 South State Street in Murray, 
Utah (Executor's deed, Exhibit I P ) . Said property, 
which is directly across from the Fashion Place Mall 
shopping center, was subsequently conveyed to Emily 
Zeese as sole owner on August 14, 1961 (Warranty 
Deed, Exhibit 2P ) . 
By written lease agreement dated October 28,1959 
(Exhibit 3P) , George and Emily Zeese leased approxi-
mately one acre of the property abutting State Street 
to Saturn Oil Company, a Missouri corporation, for 
the erection and operation of a gasoline and oil filling 
station. Saturn Oil Company drafted the lease in ques-
tion (TR. 439), which had an initial term of 10 years 
commencing December 18, 1959, and included three 
ten year options to extend the lease upon Lessee giving 
Lessor 60 days written notice prior to the end of the 
term (page 2, Tf3 of Exhibit 3P) . The leased premises 
were to be used for no other purpose or business than 
for a gasoline and oil filling station, a restaurant, a 
truck stop (page 1, fl3 of Exhibit 3P) , or to be sub-
let for a gasoline and oil filling station (page 2, Tf6 of 
Exhibit 3P) . This lease was assignable without Lessor's 
consent, provided that the Lessee-assignor would not be 
released from the lease obligations, but would at all 
times be liable for the faithful performance of all of 
the covenants of the lease (page 2, H6 of Exhibit 3P) . 
The parties further covenanted that there would be no 
waiver or any forfeiture, by acceptance of rent or 
otherwise, of any subsequent cause for forfeiture, or 
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breach of any terms and conditions of the lease (page 
4, 1F2 of Exhibit 3 P ) . In turn, the Lessors allowed 
Lessee 30 days, from receipt of notice of termination, 
to remedy any breach of the terms and conditions and 
reinstate the lease (page 3, 116 of Exhibit 3 P ) . 
Saturn Oil Company then erected a gasoline and 
oil filling station on the leased premises and operated 
it until the lease was assigned (Exhibit 4P) on March 
8,1965 (TR. 439) to J . L. Terborg & Company, a gen-
eral partnership. J . L. Terborg & Company continued 
to operate a gasoline and oil filling station on the leased 
premises until the lease was quitclaimed (Exhibit 5P) 
on June 1, 1968 by the Estate of M. H . Robineau, 
successor to J . L. Terborg & Company, to Husky Oil 
Company of Delaware (TR. 441). Husky Oil Company 
of Delaware then continued to operate a gasoline and 
oil filling station on the leased premises until April, 
1969 (TR. 443). On May 1, 1969, without prior notice 
to the Zeeses, Husky Oil Company of Delaware as-
signed (Exhibit 6P) the lease to Max Siegel, an indi-
vidual. The applicable paragraphs of Exhibit 6P read 
as follows on next page. 
4 
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ASSIGNMENT OP LEASE 
THIS ASSIGNMENT made this 1st day of May, 1969, between 
HUSKY OIL COMPANY OP DELAWARE, a corporation, with offices at 
*fO*K) East Louisiana Avenue, Denver, Colorada 80222, hereinafter 
called "Assignor" and 
MAX SIEGEL, an individual 
with offices at 6210 S. State St.. Salt Lake City, Utah 8^107 
Salt Lake City, Utah, hereinafter called "Assignee", 
• • • 
WITNESS THE SIGNATURES OF THE Assignor and Assignee 
the day and year first above written. 
ATTEST 1 
/s/ Karl F. Armta 
Karl P. Anuta, 
Assistant Secretary 
HUSKY OIL COMPANY OP DELAWARE 
Assignor 
3y /s/ L.H. Thompson 
Assignees 
STATE OF COLORADO ) 
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER ) 
Bv / R / ?--ax S iege l 
ss. 
May 1969t personally On the 1st day of 
appeared before me L.M. Thompson 
me duly sworn, did say that he is theV3 
Oil Company of Delaware, and that said instrument was signed 
on behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws 
and said L.M. Thompson acknowledged to me that said 
corporation executed the same. 
Witness my hand and official seal. 
/s/ Jeannet B. Wilson 
Notary Public 
My Commission expires: Sept. ?, 1969» 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF Davis 
) 
.) s s . 
On the 2toh day of A P r i l 
appeared before me Max Siegel 
duly sworn, did say that he i s t t e 
, 1969» personally 
, who being by me 
individual of 
and that said instrument was 
signed &Bx&©i«^xx$£x«c^ 
aaadx^ eaiAc and acknowledged 
by *oc me tka&osai&**ftX|Kmati^ 
Witness my hand and o f f i c i a l s ea l . 
/s/ Lamar Hatch 
My Commission expirest 
Notary Public 
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On or about May I, 1969, Max Siegel allowed 
Trailer Mart, Inc. to expand its trailer and recre-
ational sales outlet onto the Zeese property from the 
contiguous Jensen property for additional display area 
(TR. 549) contrary to the restrictive use covenants con-
tained in the lease. On May 6, 1969, Husky Oil Com-
pany of Delaware apprised the Zeeses by letter (Ex-
hibit 6P) that it had assigned the lease to Max Siegel, 
an individual: 
H U S K Y O I L 4040 East Louisiana Ave. 
Company Denver, Colorado 80222 
Telephone 303-756-1511 
May 6, 1969 
Mr. George Zeese 
734 South 13th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Mr. Zeese: 
Re : Lease Agreement of October 28, 1959 
Please refer to the Lease Agreement dated Oc-
tober 28, 1959, executed by you and your wife as 
lessors to Saturn Oil Company, a Missouri corpora-
tion, as lessee. As you are aware, this lease was as-
signed on March 8, 1965 by Saturn Oil Company to 
J . L. TerBorg & Co., a general partnership. By a 
further conveyance dated June 1, 1968 the successor to 
J . L. TerBorg & Co. assigned its interest in this prop-
erty to this company. Attached for your information 
is a photocopy of an assignment of this lease from this 
6 
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company to Mr. Max Siegel, an individual, whose ad-
dress is shown thereon. 
W e have directed Mr. Siegel to make all future 
payments of rental under the terms of the above-re-
ferenced Lease Agreement, in the amount of $200 per 
month, to your attention at the address shown in the 
lease which is the address to which this letter is ad-
dressed. Mr. Siegel has assumed the entire responsi-
bility for this property and its use and should any 
questions arise we believe you should contact Mr. Siegel 
d i r e c t l y- Yours truly, 
/ s / Karl F . Anuta 




On May 8, 1969, Max Siegel's attorney, David S. 
Geldzahler, sent a letter (Exhibit 7P) along with a 
copy of the assignment to notify the Zeeses that the 
lease in question had been assigned to Max Siegel, and 
that Trailer Mart, Inc. would be using the premises: 
Law Offices of 
O W E N , W A R D , & G E L D Z A H L E R 
608 E l Paso Natural Gas Building 
315 East Second South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone 359-2058 
May 8, 1969 
7 
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Mr. George Zeese 
734 South 13th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Mr. Zeese: 
As attorneys for Mr. Max Siegel, we herewith 
wish to confirm that on May 1, 1969, Husky Oil Com-
pany assigned all of its right, title and interest in and 
to that lease made by and between you and Emily 
Zeese, as Lessors, with Saturn Oil Company, as Lessee, 
on October 28, 1959, to Max Siegel, of 6210 South 
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. A copy of this 
assignment is enclosed for your records. 
Mr. Siegel has asked me to further advise you that 
Trailer Mart, Inc. doing business as Dan's Campers, 
entered into substantial commitments to acquire addi-
tional inventory because of the additional display area 
made available as a result of the assignment of the 
lease above referred to. 
Moreover, both Mr. Siegel and Trailer Mart, Inc. 
have committed themselves to a significant advertising 
program based upon the thus expanded sales facilities. 
Please be assured that both Mr. Siegel and Trailer 
Mart, Inc. will comply with all of the obligations of 
the Lessee under the lease referred to hereinabove. 
DSG:nd 
Carbon copy to : 
Mr. Max Siegel 
Very truly yours, 
/ s / David S. Geldzahler 
David S. Geldzahler 
8 
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At the time Max Siegel received the lease in ques-
tion, he was president of three corporations: Siegel 
Trailer and Auto Finance, a Utah corporation, (TR. 
415) which received the real property tax notices con-
cerning the leased premises (Exhibit 45P), and fin-
anced the trailer and recreational vehicle sales; Western 
Mobile Homes Insurance Agency, Inc., a Utah corp-
oration (TR. 419) which insured the mobile homes 
sold on the contiguous Jensen property; and Trailer 
Mart, Inc., a Nevada corporation, (TR. 416) which 
sold the trailers and recreational vehicles on the leased 
premises. 
No evidence was presented: 
1) That a board meeting was held by Trailer 
Mart, Inc., prior to Max Siegel's negotiations with 
Husky Oil Company of Delaware, orally authorizing 
Max Siegel to act on its behalf in taking the assign-
ment of the lease, 
2) That Max Siegel was authorized to act on be-
half of Trailer Mart, Inc. without a meeting of its 
board of directors, 
3) That written authorization was given by Trail-
er Mart, Inc. to Max Siegel to act on its behalf in tak-
ing the assignment of the lease from Husky Oil Com-
pany of Delaware, 
4) That a board meeting was held by Trailer 
Mart, Inc. subsequently ratifying on behalf of the corp-
oration the taking of the lease by Max Siegel, and 
9 
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5) That Trailer Mart, Inc. gave anything of 
value to Max Siegel for an assignment of the lease. 
(TR. 516). 
Nevertheless, over the repeated objections of counsel 
for Husky Oil Company of Delaware, the District 
Court found that Max Siegel was acting as agent for 
Trailer Mart, Inc. when he acquired the lease from 
Husky Oil Company of Delaware. 
Max Siegel died on June 3, 1969, thirty-three days 
after taking the assignment of the lease from Husky 
Oil Company of Delaware. Eva Siegel, Executrix 
named in the Last Will and Testament of Max Siegel, 
then sent a letter to the Zeeses concerning the lease 
option on June 16, 1969, more than one month prior 
to her receipt of letters testamentary (Probate File 
#56090). The letter (Exhibit 8P) was drafted by 
Mrs. Siegel's attorney, David S. Geldzahler, (TR. 
499) and reads as follows: 
Eva Siegel 
4155 Mount Olympus Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
June 16,1969 
Mr. George Zeese 
734 South 13th East 
£ait Lake City, Utah 
Dear Mr. Zeese: 
As the Executrix named in the Last Will and 
Testament of my husband, Max Siegel, who died on 
10 
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June 3, 1969, I am, on behalf of the estate of Max 
Siegel, deceased, hereby advising and notifying you of 
the exercise of the option to renew the lease originally 
made by and between you and Emily Zeese, as Less-
ors, and Saturn Oil Company, as Lessees, which lease 
was on May 1, 1969, assigned by Husky Oil Company 
to Max Siegel. 
The exercise of this option by the estate of Max 
Siegel will, of course, result in the extension of this 
original lease for an additional term of 10 years com-
mencing December 18, 1969, and ending December 17, 
1979, unless the option to renew the said lease for an 
additional ten-year term is exercised at such time. 
Very truly yours, 
/ s / Eva Siegel 
Eva Siegel, Executrix 
Named in the Last Will 
and Testament of 
Max Siegel, Deceased 
ES:DSG:nd 
The District Court found that Eva Siegel as Ex-
ecutrix named in the Last Will and Testament of Max 
Siegel, deceased, sent the above letter as agent for 
Trailer Mart, Inc. even though Dan Siegel, current 
president of Trailer Mart, Inc., testified that the corp-
oration did not send a letter regarding the lease option 
(TR. 533): 
11 
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Q. (By Mr. Theodore) Okay. Did Trailer 
Mart, Inc., ever send a letter to the Zeeses ex-
ercising the option ? 
A. No. 
No evidence was introduced that a board meeting 
was held giving oral authorization to Eva Siegel to act 
as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. Nor was evidence intro-
duced that written authorization was given to Eva 
Siegel to act as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. 
Probate File #56090 indicates: 
1) That Eva Siegel did not petition the Probate 
Court pursuant to section 75-11-8, U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended, for permission to continue any business in-
terests Max Siegel may have had in Trailer Mart, Inc. 
and exercise the option on its behalf, 
2) That Eva Siegel did not list the lease in the in-
ventory of the Estate of Max Siegel, even though she 
filed amended schedules to include later discovered 
properties, 
3) That Eva Siegel did not list the lease as a 
liability of the Estate of Max Siegel as she had done 
with other debts of Max Siegel, and 
4) That none of the parties filed claims against 
the Estate of Max Siegel to enforce the lease obliga-
tions after notice to creditors had been published. 
The lease was not listed on the Utah estate tax 
returns or the Federal estate tax returns (TR. 392), 
and Eva Siegel did not give anything of value to the 
Zeeses to exercise the option to extend the lease (TR. 
449). 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Trailer Mart, Inc. sent monthly checks (Exhibit 
ID) to George Zeese who cashed these checks believ-
ing that the lease had expired with Max Siegel's death 
(TR. 449), and that Trailer Mart, Inc. was a month 
to month tenant. Mr. Zeese's beliefs were based upon 
his election not to file a claim against the Estate of 
Max Siegel to enforce the lease obligations, and his 
conversations with Dan Siegel who handled the day to 
day business affairs of the Estate of Max Siegel (TR. 
500). Most of these conversations occurred during the 
Fall of 1972 and the Spring of 1973 when Dan Siegel 
was negotiating to buy the entire Emily Zeese property 
(TR. 450, 453, 454) for his seven year old niece, 
Valerie Richter; not Trailer Mart, Inc. As part of 
these negotiations, Dan Siegel had an appraisal made 
of the property (Exhibit 9P) which contained repre-
sentations that the lease had been assigned to Max 
Siegel, an individual, and that the appraised value in 
1972 was $143,000.00 subject to a $73,779.00 leasehold 
interest. George Zeese denied that the property was 
subject to a leasehold interest and refused to discount 
the selling price (TR. 512). Dan Siegel then agreed 
in the Spring of 1973 to purchase the property as 
trustee for his niece for $150,000.00 (See the terms 
of the sale which Dan wrote on the back of his business 
card, Exhibit 10P). However, the sale negotiations 
terminated when Dan Siegel insisted upon the right to 
subordinate the proposed installment sale contract to a 
building loan (TR. 455). 
Plaintiffs then served notices of termination upon 
the defendants to vacate the premises in 30 days since 
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the option to extend the lease in question was not ex-
ercised, and the defendants were violating the restrictive 
use covenants by operating a recreational vehicle and 
trailer sales outlet on the premises. Defendants re-
fused to vacate the premises or alter the use of the 
premises to reinstate the lease. 
After notices to quit had been served, Eva Siegel, 
Executrix, petitioned the Probate Court on August 
21, 1973 for permission to distribute the assets of the 
Estate of Max Siegel, and disclaimed any interest that 
the Estate of Max Siegel may have had in property 
not listed in the inventory (Probate File #56090). The 
Estate of Max Siegel then answered plaintiffs' com-
plaint by claiming a contingent interest in the lease in 
question, and filed a $780,000.00 counterclaim with-
out petitioning the Probate Court for permission to 
do so (Probate File #56090). 
On December 7, 1973, the District Court granted 
plaintiffs' motion to require the Estate of Max Siegel 
to deposit into Court, pending the outcome of the case, 
the accumulating rent and taxes allegedly owing plain-
tiffs as outlined in its pleadings. Various parties then 
deposited the accumulating rent and taxes into court 
on behalf of the Estate of Max Siegel, over the re-
peated objections of plaintiffs' counsel (Motion for 
Order to Show Cause, Objections to Findings on Plain-
tiffs' Motion for an Order to Show Cause, TR. 637). 
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A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E D I S T R I C T COURT E R R E D I N 
F I N D I N G T H A T M A X S I E G E L A C T E D AS 
A G E N T F O R T R A I L E R MART, INC. W H E N 
H E TOOK T H E A S S I G N M E N T O F T H E 
L E A S E I N Q U E S T I O N F R O M H U S K Y OIL 
COMPANY O F D E L A W A R E . 
Plaintiffs contend that the District Court erred 
in finding that Max Siegel was acting as agent for 
Trailer Mart, Inc., when he took the assignment of 
the lease from Husky Oil Company of Delaware, be-
cause the evidence, the law, and the positions taken by 
defendants' counsel do not justify the finding. 
Specifically, plaintiffs' first objection to the Dis-
trict Court's finding of Max Siegel's agency is based 
on Exhibit 6P, the assignment in question. Exhibit 
6P is the best evidence of the negotiations which oc-
curred 33 days before Max Siegel's death, and leaves 
no doubt that Max Siegel was acting as an individual 
when he took the assignment of the lease. The docu-
ment is clear and unambiguous that Max Siegel was 
not acting on behalf of any corporation when he entered 
into the lease assignment. Indeed, it was deliberately 
modified to dispel any inference that he had taken the 
assignment on behalf of a corporation. No other con-
clusion can be drawn from the alteration of the corp-
orate acknowledgement form on the signature page 
to conform with the introduction clause on page one 
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of the lease to indicate that Max Siegel signed as an 
individual. 
Therefore, the District Court erred in making find-
ings contrary to the parole evidence rule by relying on 
parole testimony to establish Max Siegel's agency at 
the time he entered into the assignment, because there 
is no ambiguity on the face of the instrument indicat-
ing that he was acting as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. 
As this Court stated in Mathis vs. Madsen, 1 U.2d 46, 
261 P.2d 952 (1953); and reaffirmed in E. A. Strout 
Western Realty Agency, Inc. vs. Owen H. Broderick, 
No. 13479 filed April 30, 1974 ...U.2d...., 522 P.2d 144 
(1974); citing B. T. Moran, Inc. vs. First Security 
Corp., 82 TJ. 316, 24 P.2d 384 (1933); and Hatch vs. 
Adams, 8 U.2d 82, 329 P.2d 285 (1958) : 
". . . In searching for the meaning the Court 
must first examine the language used in the in-
strument itself and accord to it the weight and 
effect which the instrument itself may show that 
the parties intended the words to have. If then 
its meaning is still ambiguous or uncertain, the 
Court may consider other contemporaneous writ-
ings concerning the same subject matter, and 
may, if it is still uncertain, consider parole evi-
dence of the parties' intention. See Burt vs. 
Stringfellow, 45 Utah 207, 143 P . 234; Beagley 
v. United States Gypsum Co., Utah, 235 P.2d 
783." 
The three contemporaneous writings [the letter 
from Husky Oil Company of Delaware's attorney 
dated May 6, 1969 (Exhibit 6P) containing a copy 
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of the assignment; the letter from David S. Geldzahler 
dated May 8, 1969 (Exhibit 7P) also containing a 
copy of the assignment; and the letter from Eva Siegel, 
Executrix named in the Last Will and Testament of 
Max Siegel, which was drafted by Mr. Geldzahler and 
dated June 16, 1969 (Exhibit 8 P ) ] do not alter the 
fact that Max Siegel took the assignment of the lease 
from Husky Oil Company of Delaware as an indi-
vidual. 
Therefore, unless this Court is willing to condone 
findings based on the testimony of Dan Siegel recall-
ing a long-distance telephone conversation overhead 
from another room four years before, the District Court 
erred. Especially it erred when this witness admitted 
that he was not part of the assignment negotiations 
(TR. 546)! One also wonders why Dan Siegel had pre-
pared and presented to Mr. Zeese in the Fall of 1972 
Exhibit 9P, the appraisal, which indicated that Max 
Siegel and his successors and assigns had the lease in 
question, not Trailer Mart, Inc. 
Plaintiffs' second objection to the District Court's 
finding of Max Siegel's agency is based on the law. 
Sections 25-5-1 and 3, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, state: 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property.—No 
estate or interest in real property, other than 
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any 
trust or power over or concerning real property 
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be 
created, granted, assigned, surrendered or de-
clared otherwise than by act or operation of law, 
or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed 
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by the party creating, granting, assigning, sur-
rendering or declaring the same, or by his law-
ful agent thereunto authorized in writing, (em-
phasis added) 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
—Every contract for the leasing for a longer 
period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, 
or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the 
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, 
is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the 
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized in writing, (emphasis 
added) 
Therefore, under Utah law, to act as an agent for a 
corporation, one must be authorized by a corporation 
to act on its behalf. As this Court stated in Mathis vs. 
Madsen, supra : 
"The statute of frauds, sec. 25-5-1, U.C.A. 1953, 
provides that no interest shall be created in real 
property unless it is in writing subscribed by the 
party to be charged or 'by his lawful agent there-
unto authorized by writing.' Naturally, that sec-
tion is applicable to agents of corporations, but 
the courts in interpreting similar provisions have 
adopted an exception when the person who acts 
under an oral authorization is either a general 
agent or executive officer of the corporation." 
(emphasis added) 
In that case, this Court held that where a corporate 
officer was orally given authorization by the Board of 
Directors of the Davis County Co-op prior to his enter-
ing into a land purchase contract (as evidenced by the 
minutes of a corporate meeting held prior to the trans-
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action, which were entered into the record), the statute 
of frauds was not applicable to void the transaction. 
No evidence was introduced in the present case that 
Trailer Mart, Inc. ever held a meeting to authorize 
Max Siegel, its president in 1969, to enter into an as-
signment of the lease on its behalf. Indeed, there is no 
evidence in the record that Trailer Mart, Inc., ever 
authorized Max Siegel to enter into lease contracts at 
all; not to mention the lease in question. 
When the lack of evidence of Max Siegel's corp-
orate authorization was pointed out to the District 
Court, the Court ruled these laws do not apply to fam-
ily corporations (TR. 633, 634): 
T H E COURT: You mean resolution of the 
Board of Directors or something? 
MR. T H E O D O R E : Board of Directors, Ar-
ticles of Incorporation, any such as this. Noth-
ing was presented in the record, Your Honor. 
T H E COURT: Of course, that isn't—that 
isn't the law with regard to corporations with 
few shareholders. As I recall the law is that— 
MR. T H E O D O R E : Your Honor, that case 
specifically went to corporation authorizing an 
agent. 
T H E COURT: Of course, the law draws a 
distinction between a corporation like General 
Motors, for example, and a corporation consist-
ing of a family type corporation where some-
one acts with apparent authority and there is 
nobody to object. 
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For this Court to uphold the District Court's ruling 
by carving an exception to the laws governing the 
manner in which family owned corporations may con-
duct business would circumvent the laws of the State 
of Utah. The legislature has specifically prescribed 
under sections 16-10-25, 16-10-40, and 16-10-49, U.C.A., 
1953, as amended, the manner in which corporate busi-
ness may be conducted without a meeting of the board 
of directors. Therefore, where no affirmative evidence 
was presented that Max Siegel as president of Trailer 
Mart, Inc. had authority under the articles of incorpor-
ation, the corporate by-laws or the written consent of 
all the members of the Board of Directors, to bind the 
corporation without a meeting of its board, the District 
Court erred in implying this authority simply because 
the corporation was owned by the Siegel family. Were 
the law otherwise, parties dealing with family corpor-
ations would never know if they were dealing with the 
corporation or with the officers as individuals. One 
would suspect that if the District Court's ruling were 
adopted, it would result in officers of family corpora-
tions electing to use the corporate veil when liabilities 
were encountered, and to disregard it when unfavorable 
contracts were to be voided under the statute of frauds. 
Nor can it be said that Trailer Mart, Inc. was the 
alter ego of Max Siegel, and therefore all of his actions 
were performed on behalf of Trailer Mart, Inc. The 
record clearly indicates that at the time of the assign-
ment of the lease, Max Siegel was the president of at 
least three corporations which were operating on the 
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Zeese property and the contiguous Jensen property: 
Siegel Trailer and Auto Finance, Inc.; Western Mo-
bile Homes Insurance Agency, Inc.; and Trailer Mart, 
Inc. 
In summary, the evidence introduced at the trial 
is not sufficient under the law to take the assignment 
of the lease in question out of the statute of frauds if 
Max Siegel were acting as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. 
Therefore, the assignment was either void ab initio, or 
it was entered into with Max Siegel as an individual. 
Plaintiffs' third objection to the District Court's 
finding of Max Siegel's agency is based on the fact 
that defendants' counsel during the course of this law 
suit have already conceded that Max Siegel was not 
acting as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. when he took 
the assignment from Husky Oil Company of Delaware. 
The first time counsel conceded this point was at 
the hearing dated December 7, 1973 on Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Deposit Amounts Due In Court pursuant 
to Rule 67 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiffs brought their motion to have the Estate of 
Max Siegel deposit into court the accumulating rents 
and taxes allegedly due and owing plaintiffs under 
paragraphs 61, 62, 64, 7, 19, 22, 26, and 27 of its 
answer to plaintiffs' complaint: 
61. That Trailer Mart, Inc. if not in posses-
sion of the premises as assignee of the Estate of 
Max Siegel is in possession as a subtenant of the 
Estate of Max Siegel. 
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62. Trailer Mart, Inc. is in possession of the 
premises as a subtenant of the Estate of Max 
Siegel and at all times has performed in accord 
with the lease agreement and is in possession of 
the premises by virtue of a valid and existing 
lease and subletting thereof. 
64. That Eva Siegel as Executrix of the Es-
tate of Max Siegel and Trailer Mart, Inc. are 
in possession of the premises by virtue of a valid 
and existing lease and at all times have per-
formed in accord with the lease agreement and 
stand ready to continue to perform. 
7. On or about the 1st day of May, 1969, 
Husky Oil Company assigned all of its right, 
title and interest in and to the premises and the 
lease to Max Siegel; a copy of that assignment 
is marked as Exhibit " D " and attached to plain-
tiffs' original Complaint. 
19. The lease in question was assigned by Eva 
Siegel as Executrix of the Estate of Max Siegel, 
to Trailer Mart, Inc. 
22. Plaintiffs have at all material times rec-
ognized that Trailer Mart, Inc. was properly in 
possession of the premises as assignee of the 
Estate of Max Siegel, deceased. 
26. Trailer Mart, Inc., if not in possession of 
the premises as assignee of the Estate of Max 
Siegel, deceased, is in possession of the premises 
as a subtenant of the Estate and has at all times 
performed in accord with the lease agreement 
and is in possession of the premises by virtue of 
a valid and existing lease and subletting thereto. 
27. Trailer Mart, Inc., if not in possession of 
the premises as assignee of the Estate of Max 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Siegel, deceased, is in possession of the premises 
as a subtenant of the Estate of Maw Siegel, de-
ceased. 
After the motion was argued, with the defendant Estate 
of Max Siegel and plaintiffs appearing through coun-
sel, the Honorable Ernest F . Baldwin, Jr., ordered the 
defendant, Estate of Max Siegel, to deposit into Court 
the monies due plaintiffs as alleged in its answer to 
plaintiffs' complaint. Various parties then deposited 
monies into Court on behalf of the Estate of Max 
Siegel over the objections of plaintiffs' counsel which 
were made because the estate had been distributed, and 
no petition to reopen it had been made. At no time 
did counsel for the Estate of Max Siegel indicate that 
Max Siegel took the lease as agent for Trailer Mart, 
Inc., so that the Estate of Max Siegel had no interest 
in the lease. Nor was an order sought modifying Judge 
Baldwin's order. 
The second time that counsel conceded this point 
was at the trial on May 16, 1974. In his opening state-
ment, Mr. Heyrend, stated (TB. 402): 
". . . Perhaps the most difficult and tricky con-
ceptual part of this case is the fact that there was 
no signed document from Max Siegel to Trailer 
Mart, Inc., assigning that particular piece of 
property. However, the law in this area does 
not require an assignment, a written document 
of any specific form or even a written docu-
ment." 
When later asked by the District Court to clarify his 
position, Mr. Heyrend again conceded this point (TB. 
427, 428): 
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T H E COURT: Well, what's your position 
Mr. Heyrend? You acknowledge that Mr. Sie-
gel took an assignment of the lease from Husky 
Oil Company? 
MR. H E Y R E N D : That's correct. 
T H E COURT: What's your position as to 
what he did with them thereafter or what hap-
pened to the assignment of that lease thereafter? 
MR. H E Y R E N D : It 's our position it is now 
with Trailer Mart, Inc. 
T H E COURT: Well, how did it get there ? 
MR. H E Y R E N D : That it was assigned— 
we have two—two theories. 
For the reasons outlined above, plaintiffs contend 
that the District Court erred in finding that Max Siegel 
acted as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. when he took 
the assignment of the lease from Husky Oil Company 
of Delaware. 
P O I N T I I 
UPON THE DEATH OF A LESSEE, THE 
LEASED PROPERTY COMES INTO THE 
POSSESSION OF HIS PERSONAL REPRE-
SENTATIVE. 
As outlined in Point I , plaintiffs contend that the 
District Court erred in making its finding that Max 
Siegel was acting as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. when 
he took the assignment of the lease in question. There-
fore, upon his death, the lease came into the possession 
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of Eva Siegel as Executrix, since no evidence was pre-
sented that Max Siegel ever assigned the lease to 
Trailer Mart, Inc. during the thirty-three days before 
his death. Indeed, Dan Siegel testified that no firm 
commitment as to the use of the leased premises was 
entered into by and between Max Siegel and Trailer 
Mart, Inc. (TR. 505): 
Q. (By Mr. Theodore) You have just stated 
that Trailer Mart, Inc. paid no rent to your 
father for the use of the premises at 6210 South 
State? 
A. Correct. 
Q. All right. Did Trailer Mart, Inc. have a 
firm commitment from Max Siegel as to a term 
of the use of the premises? 
A. In writing you mean or something like 
that? 
Q. Well, yes. In writing. 
A. No. 
H e also testified that no consideration was given to 
Max Siegel or the Estate of Max Siegel for an assign-
ment of the lease (TR. 516): 
Q. Did Trailer Mart, Inc. ever give the estate 
or Max Siegel anything of value for an assign-
ment of the lease? 
A. No. 
Therefore, as outlined in Thompson On Real Property, 
Vol. 3A, §1207 (Fourth Edition 1959, 1965 Supp.), no 
assignment of the lease to Trailer Mart, Inc. occurred 
where no consideration was given to Max Siegel. 
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Nor was any evidence introduced that Max Siegel 
ever disclaimed an interest in the lease as required under 
the Jensen vs OK Investment Corporation criteria, 29 
U.2d 231, 507 P.2d 713 (1973) for his subtenant 
Trailer Mart, Inc. to become the lessee. On the con-
trary, Eva Siegel's letter (Exhibit 8P) clearly indi-
cates an intent on the part of his legal successor, the 
Estate of Max Siegel, to claim an interest in the lease! 
The unexpired portion of the lease therefore passed 
into the Estate of Max Siegel upon his death. This 
rule of succession is found in Brown's Executor vs. 
United States Trust Co., 185 Ky. 747, 215 S.W. 815 
(1919); and followed in Olson et at. vs. Frazer et al, 
154 Kan. 310, 118 P.2d 505 (1941); Southern Pacific 
Company vs. Swanson, 73 CA 229, 238 P . 736 (1925); 
and Joost vs. Castel, 33 CA 2d 138, 91 P.2d 172 
(1939). The Kentucky Court stated : 
". . . when a lessee of property like this dies, the 
leased property comes into the possession of his 
personal representative, and he has only three 
rights of election in respect to it: First, he may 
keep the property, thereby charging the estate 
with the performance of the terms and conditions 
of the lease. Second, he may, if the contract or 
statute permit it, sublease the premises; but this 
would not, of course, relieve the estate of its ob-
ligation to satisfy the terms and conditions of 
the lease as between it and the landlord. Third, 
he may surrender the leased property to the 
landlord, and refuse to have anything further 
to do with it, thereby working a cancellation of 
the lease; but the doing of this would subject the 
estate to a suit for damages by the landlord for 
breach of contract." 
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The right to renew a lease also passes to the represent-
ative of a deceased lessee, and, if he fails to exercise the 
lease option, the lease terminates; see Hart et al. vs. 
Walker, 40 N.M. 1, 52 P.2d 123 (1935). 
Therefore, upon the death of Max Siegel, the lease 
held by him passed to his legal representative, Eva 
Siegel as Executrix, to be listed as an asset of the 
estate and properly accounted for as required by Miller 
vs. Ready, 59 InA 195, 108 N.E. 605 (1915); and 
discussed in 68 A.L.R. 590, and 5lC C.J.S. Landlord 
and Tenant §92: 
"In case of the death of the lessee, the term or 
the unexpired portion thereof becomes a part of 
the personal assets of the estate, to be inven-
toried, appraised, and sold as any other personal 
property." 
Eva Siegel, acting as Executrix, would then have 
had to exercise the option in the manner specified to 
extend the lease as discussed in the Aiken vs. Less Tay-
lor Motor Company case, 110 U. 265, 171 P.2d 676 
(1946): 
"I t is elementary that an option to renew con-
tained in a lease must be exercised to effect the 
renewal. Usually affirmative acts are required 
either by the express terms of the lease or by 
implication of law to exercise the option to re-
new . . . 
Though the ordinary case requires affirmative 
acts to exercise the option to renew, the parties 
to a lease may specify any method they choose of 
the way the option is to be exercised." 
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Also, see Nance vs. Schoonover, No. 13471 Filed April 
23, 1974, ....U.2d...., 521 P.2d 896 (1974), and the cases 
cited therein. Since the parties to the lease by and be-
tween George and Emily Zeese and Saturn Oil Com-
pany agreed that: 
"As a further consideration of this Lease, L E S -
SOR hereby gives and grants unto the L E S -
S E E the exclusive option and privilege of re-
newing and extending the Lease for T H R E E 
(3) additional terms of T E N (10) Y E A R S 
each, provided L E S S E E shall give notice in 
writing to L E S S O R on or before 60 days be-
fore the expiration of the original term of this 
Lease or any succeeding option term." 
Eva Siegel, acting as executrix, would have had to 
send written notice of her intent to exercise the option 
to extend the lease on behalf of the Estate of Max 
Siegel prior to October 28,1969. 
When she sent Exhibit 8P regarding the lease 
option on June 16, 1969, more than one month prior to 
her receipt of letters testamentary, Eva Siegel would 
have had to have been exercising one of those executory 
powers enumerated in Section 74-3-19, U.C.A., 1953, 
as amended: 
74-3-19. Executor must qualify—Limited power 
before letters issue.—No person has any power 
as an executor until he qualifies, except that be-
fore letters have been issued he may pay fun-
eral charges and take necessary measures for the 
preservation of the estate. 
Because the probate file does not indicate that the lease 
was extended and included as part of the Estate of 
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Max Siegel, Eva Siegel was not protecting an asset 
of the estate in sending Exhibit 8P ; and therefore her 
offer was void under the recent Estate Realty, Inc. vs. 
Kershaw ruling, 29 U.2d 92, 505 P.2d 777 (1973). In 
that case, this Court voided a real estate sales commis-
sion contract because it was signed by an executor one 
month prior to his receipt of letters testamentary. 
Nor did Eva Siegel have any intention of exercis-
ing the lease option to extend the term on behalf of 
the Estate of Max Siegel. This is evidenced by her 
failure to inventory the lease, set aside a contingent 
fund to satisfy future rents, and to list the lease on 
the federal and state estate tax returns.1 Had she so 
intended, she had three months from the date she re-
ceived letters testamentary to petition the Probate 
Court for permission to exercise the lease option or to 
ratify the sending of Exhibit 8P. Indeed, where she 
was aware of the necessity of petitioning the Probate 
Court to enter into contracts on behalf of the Estate 
of Max Siegel (as evidenced by the petition filed Sep-
tember 16, 1969 for permission to borrow money on 
behalf of the estate), her failure to get court approval 
to extend the lease was no oversight. Especially when 
i See 26 U.S.C.A. Internal Revenue Code §2031 which would re-
quire that the lease assigned to Max Siegel be included in his 
gross estate if the parties had not allowed the lease to lapse; 
and its counterpart under Utah law, §59-12-3, U.C.A., 1953, 
as amended. Also see Opinions of the Accounting Principles 
Board, No. 5, September 1964, Reporting of Leases in Financial 
Statements of Lessee as supplemented by Opinions of the Ac-
counting Principles Board, No. 31, June 1973, Disclosure of 
Lease Commitments by Lessees, which would also have re-
quired that the lease be listed on the financial statements of 
the Estate of Max Siegel if the parties had not allowed the 
lease to lapse. 
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she subsequently petitioned eleven times to enter into 
additional contracts to borrow money on behalf of the 
estate, and amended the inventory to include after dis-
covered property. 
In summary, since Eva Siegel as Executrix did 
not inventory the lease by petitioning the Probate Court 
for permission to exercise the option to extend the 
lease on behalf of the Estate of Max Siegel, she had 
no capacity to contract and the offer was void; see 
In re Grattan's Estate. Bethel College of Newton vs. 
Pihlblad, 155 Kan. 839, 130 P.2d 580 (1942), which 
held that executors must render their accounts to the 
probate court for approval to bind the estate, especially 
for acts committed prior to receipt of letters testament-
ary. The lease, therefore, expired December 17, 1969. 
Nor did any party file a contingent claim against 
the Estate of Max Siegel to require Eva Siegel as Ex-
ecutrix to extend the lease and charge the estate with 
the performance of its terms and conditions after 
notice to creditors had been published pursuant to sec-
tion 75-9-4, U.C.A., 1953, as amended: 
"75-9-4. Claims to be presented within time lim-
its—Exceptions—All claims arising upon con-
tract, whether the same are due, not due or con-
tingent, must be presented within the time limited 
in the notice, and any claim not presented is 
barred forever; provided, that when it is made 
to appear by the affidavit of the claimant, to the 
satisfaction of the court or judge thereof, that 
the claimant had no notice as provided in this 
chapter by reason of being out of state, it may 
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be presented at any time before a decree of dis-
tribution is entered; provided further, that noth-
ing in this title contained shall be so construed 
as to prohibit the foreclosure of liens or mort-
gages as hereinafter provided." 
Simply put, if Trailer Mart, Inc., subtenant of the 
Estate of Max Siegel, were relying on the lease in 
question, it should have filed a claim against the Estate 
of Max Siegel to have Eva Siegel as Executrix extend 
the lease and protect its subtenancy rights. Defendants' 
claims and counterclaims against the plaintiffs should 
therefore be dismissed since the lease expired because 
of their own failure to take proper steps to preserve the 
lease. 
For additional authorities on the necessity of pre-
senting contingent claims against an estate to enforce 
the obligations entered into by a decedant, see: Hollo-
ran-Judge Trust Co. vs. Heath et. aZ., 70 U. 124, 258 
P . 342 (1927) holding that a building management con-
tract entered into prior to the death of the principal 
must be filed as a contingent claim against his estate 
in order for the contract to be specifically enforced; 
Lesser vs. Pomin, 3 CA2d 117, 39 P.2d 451 (1934); 
Joost vs. Cast el, supra, holding that rents to accrue 
under a lease must be filed as a contingent claim against 
an estate; Tropico Land and Improvement Co. vs. 
Lamhourn, 170 Cal. 33, 148 P . 206 (1915); Verdier 
vs. Roach, 96 Cal. 467, 31 P . 554 (1892), holding that 
a covenant in a lease for indemnity from water damage 
must be presented as a contingent claim even though 
the breach has not yet occurred; and Bancroft's Probate 
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Practice, Vol. 3, §769, §772, §773, §774, and §786 (Sec-
ond Edition 1950, 1974 Supp.) for a complete dis-
cussion of the necessity of presenting contingent claims 
against an estate to enforce the obligations entered into 
by a decendent prior to his death. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E D i a x R I C T COURT E R R E D I N 
F I N D I N G T H A T E V A S I E G E L , E X E C U -
T R I X N A M E D I N T H E L A S T W I L L A N D 
T E S T A M E N T O F M A X S I E G E L , W A S ACT-
I N G A S A G E N T FOR T R A I L E R MART, INC. 
W H E N S H E S E N T T H E L E T T E R R E G A R D -
I N G T H E L E A S E O P T I O N . 
Plaintiffs contend that if the finding is correct 
that Husky Oil Company of Delaware assigned the 
lease directly to Trailer Mart, Inc., the District Court 
erred in finding that Eva Siegel, Executrix Named in 
the Last Will and Testament of Max Siegel, was act-
ing as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. when she sent to 
the Zeeses Exhibit 8P regarding the lease option. 
First, the finding of Eva Siegel's agency is clearly 
contrary to the evidence introduced at trial. Not only 
does Exhibit 8P state that the letter was sent on be-
half of the Estate of Max Siegel which claimed the 
lease in question, there is no other evidence in the 
record to support the finding of Eva Siegel's agency. 
When asked if Trailer Mart, Inc., ever sent a letter 
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regarding the lease option, Dan Siegel, current presi-
dent of Trailer Mart, Inc., stated (TR. 533): 
Q. (By Mr. Theodore) Okay. Did Trailer 
Mart, Inc., ever send a letter to the Zeeses exer-
cising the option? 
A. No. 
Later, when asked why Eva Siegel sent the letter on 
behalf of the Estate of Max Siegel when Trailer Mart, 
Inc. was in possession of the property, Dan Siegel ex-
plained (TR. 560): 
A. When Max died we were trying to cover 
a lot of loose ends. This seemed to be one of 
them. I t seemed appropriate for the Executrix 
of the Estate to notify Mr. Zeese who had un-
doubted heard of Max's death that the business 
was going to be carried on and we did it in the 
form of an exercise of the option. 
When you are doing business on a day-to-day 
basis you often don't look toward the niceties of 
the legal entities and we simply as you can see 
from the document exercised it in that manner. 
This incredulous explanation of Exhibit 8P's mean-
ing is even more perplexing when one notes that the 
letter was drafted by Dan and Eva Siegel's attorney, 
and that it contains no mention of the business. Nor 
was notice ever forwarded to the Zeeses indicating that 
the letter was in error. I t is also disturbing to note that 
Dan Siegel represented to plaintiffs all during the nego-
tiations to purchase the Zeese property that Max Siegel, 
an individual and his legal successors—the Estate of 
Max Siegel—had the lease in question, not Trailer 
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Mart, Inc. (see page 10 of Exhibit 9P which formed 
the basis of the purchase negotiations). 
Hence, if the lease were assigned to Trailer Mart, 
Inc. by Husky Oil Company of Deleware, the finding 
that Eva Siegel, Executrix named in the Last Will 
and Testament of Max Siegel, exercised the lease 
option on behalf of Trailer Mart, Inc. is not supported 
by the record, and is therefore in error. Since Trailer 
Mart, Inc. did not exercise the lease option, the lease 
expired December 28,1969. 
Second, the law does not support Eva Siegel's 
agency. Apparently the District Court ignored the 
long established principle that death of an agent term-
inates the agency relationship; see Restatement of Law 
Second, Agency, Vol. 1, §121 (1958). Therefore, if 
Max Siegel were acting as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. 
in taking the lease from Husky Oil Company of Dela-
ware, upon his death the agency relationship termin-
ated so that his executrix could not substitute as agent 
for Trailer Mart, Inc. Also, Eva Siegel as Executrix 
did not have the capacity to act as agent for Trailer 
Mart, Inc. without petitioning the Probate Court for 
permission to continue any business interests Max Sie-
gel may have had in Trailer Mart, Inc. Section 75-11-
8, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, states: 
"75-11-8. Continuing decedent's business—When 
the interests of creditors are not prejudiced 
thereby, the court may prescribe that the busi-
ness in which the decedent was engaged at the 
time of his death may be continued for such 
length of time as may be necessary to permit 
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the affairs of the estate to be wound up to the 
best advantage." (emphasis added) 
When no petition was filed with the Probate Court to 
continue any business interests the decedent may have 
had in Trailer Mart, Inc. (assuming contrary to the 
evidence introduced that Trailer Mart, Inc. was the 
alter ego of Max Siegel), Eva Siegel as Executrix 
had no authority to act as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. 
by sending her letter (Exhibit 8P) . 
The finding of Eva Siegel's "agency" is also con-
trary to the statute of frauds, sections 25-5-1 and 3, 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended, supra. Again, no evidence 
was presented: 
1) That Trailer Mart, Inc. ever held a board meet-
ing orally authorizing Eva Siegel as Executrix of the 
Estate of Max Siegel to exercise the lease option and 
extend the term on its behalf, 
2) That Trailer Mart, Inc. gave written authoriz-
ation to Eva Siegel as Executrix of the Estate of Max 
Siegel to act as its agent, which this Court required in 
the Lee vs. Polyhrones case, 57 U. 401, 195 P . 201 
(1921) ; the Baugh vs. Logan City case, 27 U.2d 291, 
495 P.2d 814 (1972), holding that the minutes of a 
Logan City Commission meeting were not sufficient 
authorization under the statute of frauds to allow the 
Mayor to bind the City inasmuch as the minutes were 
not subscribed by the principals; and the Frandsen vs. 
Gerstner case, 26 U.2d 180, 487 P.2d 697 (1971), hold-
ing that real estate agents must have separate written 
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authority from their principals to enter into contracts 
to sell land, which is listed with them for sale. 
3) That Trailer Mart, Inc. ever held a Board 
meeting ratifying the sending of Eva Siegel's letter 
regarding the option. 
4) That Eva Siegel had authority to act on behalf 
of Trailer Mart, Inc., without a meeting of its Board 
of Directors, or 
5) That the defendants ever complied with the 
lease terms by operating a gasoline and oil filling sta-
tion to take the lease out of the statute of frauds under 
the doctrine of part performance (see stipulation of 
counsel on page 462 of the Court Transcript). 
Trailer Mart, Inc ' s claim of a leasehold interest 
is therefore barred under the statute of frauds, and the 
lease was either void ab initio or expired on December 
28, 1969 when Trailer Mart, Inc. did not exercise the 
option to extend the lease. 
In summary, if the lease were assigned directly to 
Trailer Mart, Inc. by Husky Oil Company of Dela-
ware, the finding that Eva Siegel, Executrix named 
in the Last Will and Testament of Max Siegel, 
exercised the option to extend the lease on behalf of 
Trailer Mart, Inc. is not supported by the record or 
the law, and is therefore in error. 
At this point it might be helpful to the Court to 
point out why the record fails to support the findings 
of Trailer Mart, Inc 's involvement in the lease trans-
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actions. Counsel's theory of proof is found on page 
547 of the official transcript: 
MR. H E Y R E N D : Well, Mr. Siegel has 
testified he was an officer of Trailer Mart and 
is answering the questions in that regard. I t is 
always a problem when you are dealing with a 
corporation because the corporation has no more 
substance than the officers themselves and, there-
fore, any intent of the corporation would be ex-
pressed in the intent of any of the officers. To 
that extent I think Mr. Siegel was directing 
himself. 
Even the District Court rejected this manner of proof 
at trial (TR. 547): 
T H E COURT: Of course, he can only 
testify to his own intent. 
MR. H E Y R E N D : That's correct. That's 
correct as an officer. 
T H E COURT: As an officer ? 
MR. H E Y R E N D : Yes. 
T H E COURT: As long as we understand we 
are talking about his own state of mind. 
Apparently counsel tried to impute the agency of Max 
Siegel and Eva Eiegel on behalf of Trailer Mart, Inc. 
through the testimony of Dan Siegel who did not par-
ticipate in the assignment negotiations, and who was 
not authorized to direct Eva Siegel as Executrix to be 
an agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. without approval of 
the Probate Court. This witness was therefore not in 
privity with the lease, and was also incompetant to 
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testify as to the events which took place between Max 
Siegel and Husky Oil Company of Delaware. 
For this Court to approve this manner of proof 
to transfer leases involving estates will result in num-
erous frauds and sham arrangements designed to by-
pass the Probate Court and the State Tax Commis-
sion. Indeed, it is quite obvious that Eva Siegel was 
either trying to avoid probating the lease in question, 
or she decided that it had little value in 1969 and 
elected to let it lapse. Defendants then tried to claim 
a leasehold interest in the property in 1972 when the 
construction of a new shopping center across the street 
inflated property values in the surrounding area (See 
Exhibit 56P, the April 1972 aerial photograph showing 
the beginning construction of the shopping center). 
This Court should therefore strike down this agency 
fiction designed to bypass the Probate Court, and re-
verse the judgment of the District Court. 
P O I N T IV 
T H E D I S T R I C T COURT E R R E D I N IN-
V O K I N G T H E D O C T R I N E O F E S T O P P E L TO 
P R E C L U D E P L A I N T I F F S F R O M E N F O R C -
I N G T H E R E S T R I C T I V E U S E COVENANTS 
C O N T A I N E D I N T H E L E A S E . 
If the lease option were exercised, the defendants 
breached the lease by operating a trailer and recrea-
tional vehicle sales outlet on the premises, and the Dis-
trict Court erred in invoking the doctrine of estoppel 
to preclude plaintiffs from enforcing the restrictive use 
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covenants contained therein. The Utah law governing 
estoppel was outlined in Migliaccio vs. Davis, 120 U. 1, 
232P.2dl95 (1951) on page 198: 
"Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais is the 
principle by which a party who knows or should 
know the truth is absolutely precluded, both at 
law and in equity, from denying or asserting the 
contrary of, any material fact, which, by his 
words or conduct, affirmative or negative, in-
tentionally or through culpable negligence, he 
has induced another, who was excusably ignorant 
of the true facts and who had a right to rely upon 
such words and conduct, to believe and act upon 
them thereby, as a consequence reasonably to be 
anticipated, changing his position in such a way 
that he would suffer injury if such denial or 
contrary assertion were allowed/' (Emphasis 
added) 
Therefore, for an estoppel to arise, there must be: 
1) Concealment or misrepresentation of a ma-
terial fact, 
2) Inducement of another to act, 
3) Reliance by a party who at the time he acted 
had no way of acquiring the true facts through rea-
sonable diligence, and who had a right to rely upon 
such words or conduct, and 
4) Injury suffered as a consequence of his changed 
position if the contrary assertion were allowed. 
Applying the facts of the present case to the above 
criteria for an estoppel to arise, several elements are 
missing: 
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a) The plaintiffs did not conceal or misrepresent 
any facts to the defendants. Indeed, if the District 
Court's findings are correct that Trailer Mart, Inc. 
received the lease from Husky Oil Company of Dela-
ware, the only misrepresentations were made by the 
defendants representing that the Estate of Max Siegel 
had the lease in July 1969 (Exhibit 8P) through the 
Fall of 1972 and the Spring of 1973 (Exhibit 9P) . 
Nor did the plaintiffs conceal from the defendants 
that they did not have a valid lease. The evidence in-
troduced concerning the parties' bargaining positions 
during the negotiations to sell the Zeese property in the 
Fall of 1972 and the Spring of 1973 clearly indicates 
that George Zeese refused to acknowledge that the 
property was subject to a leasehold interest. When 
Dan Siegel presented the appraisal prepared for him 
by Raymond S. Fletcher which indicated that Max 
Siegel, an individual and his successors and heirs had 
a $73,779.00 leasehold interest in the Zeese property 
(Exhibit 9P) , George Zeese completely rejected Dan 
Siegel's representations, and countered, instead, with a 
firm selling price of $150,000.00 which was $6,000.00 
above the appraised value for the entire property. Dan 
Siegel, therefore, knew when George Zeese refused to 
discount the selling price in the Fall of 1972 that 
George Zeese believed that the lease had lapsed. In-
deed, Dan Siegel also believed that the lease had 
lapsed inasmuch as he agreed in the Spring of 1973 
that the selling price of $150,000.00 would not be dis-
counted $73,779.00 for a leasehold interest [See Ex-
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hibit 10P, Dan Siegel's business card containing the 
terms of the sale which he wrote on the back. Also 
note that Dan Siegel was negotiating to purchase the 
property on behalf of his niece, Valerie Richter, who 
had no interest in Trailer Mart, Inc. (TR. 514)]. 
Simply stated, would a reasonably prudent busi-
nessman deliberately waive a $73,779.00 leasehold in-
terest if he had a binding lease? Certainly not. There 
is no question that Dan Siegel knew that the lease had 
lapsed, and therefore George Zeese would not have a 
duty to inform him of that fact. 
b) The plaintiffs did not induce Max Siegel to 
take an assignment of the lease in question, nor did 
they induce Trailer Mart, Inc. to expand its display 
area by moving onto the Zeese property from the con-
tiguous Jensen property. Indeed, the Zeeses never met 
Max Siegel (TR. 448); and Trailer Mart, Inc., moved 
onto the Zeese property the first part of May 1969, 
over a week before the Zeeses were notified by Husky 
Oil Company of Delaware that the lease had been as-
signed to Max Siegel, an individual (Exhibit 6P) . 
c) The defendants at the time they acted were m 
a position to ascertain that the lease in question con-
tained restrictive use covenants limiting the use of the 
premises to a gasoline and oil filling station since all 
parties had a copy of the lease. The defendants were 
also in a position to ascertain: 1) that Eva Siegel had 
not received letters testamentary to act on behalf of 
the Estate of Max Siegel when she sent the letter re-
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garding the lease option, and 2) that Eva Siegel as 
Executrix of the Estate of Max Siegel did not list the 
lease as an asset or liability of the estate or petition for 
permission to exercise the option. Therefore, as out-
lined in Coombs vs. Ouzounian, 24 U.2d 39, 465 P.2d 
356 (1970), since all parties had copies of the lease, and 
the means to ascertain Eva Siegel's incapacity to con-
tract, the doctrine of estoppel should not be invoked 
(In the Coombs case, supra, this Court ruled that no 
estoppel arose to enforce a sale of property when a wife 
had not authorized her husband to sign a deed on her 
behalf, and the party claiming estoppel had means to 
ascertain whether she had done so). 
Nor did the defendants have a right to rely on a 
leasehold interest since: 
i) Dan Siegel, President of Trailer Mart, Inc., 
testified that the corporation did not exercise the op-
tion to extend the term of the lease. Therefore, if 
Husky Oil Company of Delaware assigned the lease 
to Trailer Mart, Inc., the lease lapsed when Trailer 
Mart, Inc., failed to exercise the lease option. 
ii) If the lease passed into Max Siegel's Estate 
upon his death because Husky Oil Company of Dela-
ware assigned the lease to Max Siegel as an individual, 
Trailer Mart, Inc., was a subtenant of the Estate of 
Max Siegel and therefore not entitled to rely upon an 
extension of the lease unless the lease were probated. 
As outlined in Cifelli vs. Santamaria, 79 N.J .L . 354, 
75 At. 434 (1910): 
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"Nor was appellant entitled, as a subtenant, to a 
renewal of the lease. He had no privity with the 
landlord, is not liable on the tenant's covenants, 
and cannot take advantage of the landlord's cov-
enants with the lessee . . . 
So, while a lawful assignee of the lease may ex-
ercise his assignor's option of renewal, I find no 
authority holding that its option may be exer-
cised by an undertenant as such . . . . and it is 
quite clear that no such right exists. Hence, 
even if it be considered that the acceptance of 
rent directly from the appellant as subtenant, 
and notice to quit served on him, amounted to a 
recognition of his subtenancy, such recognition 
did not give him the rights of the original tenant 
to a renewal." 
Also see Audubon Hotel Co. vs. Braunnig, 120 La 
1089, 46 So. 33 (1908): 
"The sublease is a new contract . . . The lessor 
is not a party to the sublease, and the subtenant 
is not a party to the original lease. There is no 
contractual tie between the subtenant and the 
owner or lessor. The lease of the subtenant term-
inates with the lease from whom he holds as ten-
ant. The lessee of the owner stands between the 
subtenant and the lessor, the owner. It is as to 
the former, his lessor, that the subtenant must 
address himself in asserting his rights. The sub-
tenant cannot defeat the original lessor suing to 
be reinstated in the possession of the property 
after his lease has expired. I t is true that the 
subtenant has all the lessee's right to enjoy the 
property. This right does not go further. I t does 
not include in addition the right of renewal given 
by the first lessor to his lessee. A subtenant has 
no action against the owner or original lessor for 
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a renewal of the lease by reason of the fact that 
there is no contract between him and the original 
lessor, and no legal tie which he can invoke." 
(emphasis added) 
and M. B. Zeldman vs. A. Davis, 161 Tx 496, 342 
S.W.2d555 (1961): 
"There is no privity of contract between a sub-
lessee and the original lessor . . . And so it is held 
that a sub-lessee does not acquire or succeed to 
the option of a lessee to purchase the premises 
• . . or to his option to renew the lease. 
Since Davis (sublessee) had no legal right to ex-
ercise the option and thus to extend the term of 
the lease, his misinterpretation of the lease and 
detrimental conduct under the misinterpretation 
would not confer on him the right to exercise the 
option belatedly or estop the lessors from assert-
ing that the option had not been timely exercised 
by Landry (lessee, sublessor)." 
This privity of contract principle is also found in Lou-
dave Estates, Inc. vs. Cross Roads Improvements Co. 
Inc., 28 M.2d 54, 214 N.Y. Supp. 2d 72 (1961): 
Novosad vs. Clary, 431 S.W.2d 422 (1968); Hart et 
al vs. Walker, supra, where the New Mexico Supreme 
Court ruled that even the heirs of a deceased lessee 
could not exercise a renewal option if the administrator 
refused to renew a state land lease; 127 A.L.R. 948, 
and 51 A.L.R.2d 1404. 
Therefore, since Trailer Mart, Inc. as a subtenant 
was not in privity with the lease to exercise the option, 
and Eva Siegel did not exercise the option to extend 
the lease on behalf of the Estate of Max Siegel, the 
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lease terminated December 28, 1969. The Estate of 
Max Siegel and its subtenants then became month to 
month hold over tenants. 
iii) No consideration was given to the plaintiffs to 
exercise the option and extend the lease for an addi-
tional term, or to modify its restrictive use covenants. 
As the Supreme Court of the State of Washington ob-
served in construing a gasoline and oil filling station 
lease identical to the one in question, the option pro-
visions lack mutuality since no additional benefit or 
consideration is conferred on the lessor to extend the 
lease when the lessee merely sends written notice of his 
intention to extend the lease, see Logan vs. Time Oil 
Company, 73 Wash.2d 161, 437 P.2d 192 (1968). That 
Court recognized the grave inequities which arise where 
a lessee attempts to overdraft a lease and get some-
thing for nothing. This dispute presents a sublessee 
which not only refused to pay anything for the right 
to extend the lease term, but refused to pay anything 
for the right to modify the restrictive use covenants. 
Indeed, defendant Trailer Mart, Inc. claims extensive 
damages if it loses a leasehold interest; not for damages 
incurred, but for the loss of a bargain! (Note the meth-
od of computing the $780,000.00 counterclaim on page 
6 of Dan Siegel's Answers to Interrogatories.) No 
better example can be found of a party trying to take 
advantage of an overdrafted lease taken behind the back 
of the lessor who was negotiating with the lessee Husky 
Oil Company of Delaware to cancel the lease (TR. 
444). This Court is therefore strongly urged to cancel 
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the lease as lacking mutuality as it did the employment 
contract in the Allen vs. Rose Park Pharmacy case, 
120 U. 608, 237 P.2d 823 (1951). 
In summary, the elements of estoppel are not sup-
ported by the evidence, and the District Court erred 
in invoking the doctrine. The District Court appar-
ently confused the doctrine of estoppel with the doc-
trine of waiver which is discussed in Point V. 
P O I N T V 
T H E D I S T R I C T COURT E R R E D I N IN-
V O K I N G T H E D O C T R I N E O F W A I V E R TO 
P R E C L U D E P L A I N T I F F S F R O M E N F O R C -
I N G T H E R E S T R I C T I V E U S E COVENANTS 
C O N T A I N E D I N T H E L E A S E . 
If the lease option were exercised, the defendants 
breached the lease, and the District Court erred in in-
voking the doctrine of waiver to preclude the plaintiff's 
from enforcing the restrictive use covenants. 
In the second paragraph on page 4 of the lease, 
the parties covenanted that: 
"No waiver of any forfeiture, by acceptance of 
rent or otherwise shall waive any subsequent 
breach of any conditions of this Lease; nor shall 
any consent to any assignment or subletting of 
said premises, as aforesaid, be held to waive or 
release any assignee or sublessee from any of the 
foregoing conditions or covenants as against him 
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or them, but every such assignee or sublessee 
shall be expressly subject thereto." 
All parties therefore understood that the use of the 
premises was to be governed strictly by the lease pro-
visions when they agreed that there would be no waiver 
of any forfeiture, by acceptance of rent of otherwise. 
Indeed, Saturn Oil Company specifically negotiated 
for the right to erect and operate a gasoline and oil 
filling station and drafted the lease accordingly. Sat-
urn Oil Company, its successors and assigns, further 
covenanted in the sixth paragraph on page 3 of the 
lease to remedy any breach of the restrictive use cov-
enants within 30 days from the date of notice of term-
ination : 
". . . failure of the L E S S E E to promptly keep 
and perform each and every covenant, agreement 
and obligation of this Lease on the part of the 
L E S S E E to be kept and performed, shall, at 
the option of the LESSOR, cause the forfeiture 
of this Lease. If the L E S S E E shall be in de-
fault of any of its obligations under this Lease, 
LESSEE"shal l have thirty (30) Days from 
date of notice by L E S S O R to correct such de-
fault, and if such default shall not be corrected, 
possession of the within demised premises and all 
additions and permanent improvements therof 
shall be delivered to the LESSOR, and there-
upon L E S S O R shall be entitled to and may take 
possession of the demised premises, any other 
notice or demand being hereby waived." 
Therefore, the plaintiffs, by accepting rent, did not 
waive the right to object to the defendants' continuing 
breach of the lease in maintaining a recreational vehicle 
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and trailer sales outlet on the premises after notice of 
plaintiffs' election to enforce strictly the provisions of 
the lease. 
As outlined in Robinson vs. Hadley, 351 F.2d 385 
(1965) (9thCir. C.A.): 
"This rule is especially applicable where the lease 
expressly provides that the waiver of any breach 
should not be deemed a waiver of a subsequent 
breach." 
Also, see Thompson On Real Property, Vol. 3A, §1328 
(Fourth Edition 1959,1965 Supp., p. 578: 
"Yet, even after an estoppel, if the covenantee 
gives notice that he intends henceforth to stand 
upon his legal right, it has been held that he may 
enforce the terms of the contract strictly from 
that time on." 
and p. 581 : 
"Any inference of a waiver by the landlord of a 
forfeiture of the lease by acceptance of the rent 
with knowledge of a breach of condition or cov-
enant is rebutted by a provision in the lease that 
the receipt of rent with knowledge of any breach 
shall not be deemed a waiver." 
This general rule is outlined in 49 Am.Jur.2d §1063, 
page 1027: 
"But the general rule is that a waiver of a 
right of forfeiture for breach of a covenant in a 
lease does not operate as a waiver with respect 
to a continuance of the breach, where the breach 
is a continuing one, and it does not operate as a 
waiver of the right of forfeiture for a subsequent 
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breach of the covenant. Thus the receipt of rent 
by a landlord with knowledge of the breach of 
conditions in a lease does not estop him from 
declaring a forfeiture for a continuance of the 
cause of the forfeiture after the acceptance of 
rent or for subsequent breaches of the covenant." 
and also found in 5lC Corpus Juris Secundum, Land-
lord and Tenant §117 (6). 
The plaintiffs were therefore not precluded from 
enforcing the restrictive use covenants contained in the 
lease, since the defendants are unable to raise the de-
fense of waiver without breaching the lease. Clearly 
the District Court erred in sustaining the defense of 
waiver. 
The District Court's election to divide the trial of 
plaintiffs' cause of action into the issue of liability, and 
the issue of damages was unfortunate since plaintiffs 
were not given the opportunity of presenting evidence 
of their damages resulting from the defendants opera-
tion of a trailer and recreational vehicle sales outlet. 
The importance of these restrictive use covenants was 
consequently lost to the District Court. Plaintiffs would 
have established that the recreational vehicle and trailer 
displays act as a wall isolating the rear portion of the 
property from further commercial development which 
can be seen from the aerial photograph taken in July 
1973 (Exhibit 44P). A gasoline and oil filling station 
operation allows traffic to flow from State Street 
through the frontage of the property thereby allowing 
further commercial development of the rear of the prop-
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erty. The District Court's ruling leaves the plaintiffs 
with landlocked property without any compensation 
from the defendants for the right to modify the re-
strictive use covenants which were negotiated by the 
defendants' predecessor, Saturn Oil Company. 
I t is also difficult to understand the District 
Court's reasoning for invoking waiver. The ruling em-
phasized that the defendants acted in reliance upon a 
lease even though they never complied with its restric-
tions or paid to have them modified. In effect, the Dis-
trict Court ruled that the plaintiffs had been generous 
in allowing the defendants to use their property con-
trary to the lease restrictions without compensation, 
and now that the plaintiffs need the property utilized 
in conformance with the lease provisions which the de-
fendants agreed to, it is too much of a hardship for the 
defendants to comply with their bargain! 
The ruling also emphasized that the plaintiffs 
didn't inform the defendants of the lease restrictions 
with which defendants' attorney assured the Zeeses that 
they would comply. Again, the District Court in effect 
ruled that plaintiffs had a written lease agreement with 
the defendants outlining the terms and conditions for 
the use of the property, but they should have explained 
those terms and conditions to the defendants and their 
counsel! Simply put, would a landlord respond to a 
letter of assurances sent by lessee's attorney (See the 
last paragraph in Exhibit 7 P ) : 
"Please be assured that both Mr. Siegel and 
Trailer Mart, Inc., will comply with all of the 
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obligations of the Lessee under the lease referred 
to hereinabove." 
by explaining the lease terms to his attorney? 
Plaintiffs therefore urge this Court to enforce the 
lease restrictions originally bargained for, and reverse 
the District Court's invocation of the doctrine of waiver 
to preclude the enforcement of the restrictive use cov-
enants contained in the lease. 
P O I N T V I 
T H E D I S T R I C T COURT E R R E D I N IN-
V O K I N G T H E D O C T R I N E O F E S T O P P E L 
A N D W A I V E R TO P R E C L U D E P L A I N T I F F S 
F R O M J U D G M E N T A G A I N S T H U S K Y O I L 
COMPANY O F D E L A W A R E F O R B R E A C H 
O F T H E L E A S E BY I T S A S S I G N E E , T R A I L -
E R MART, INC. 
If the District Court's findings are correct that 
Trailer Mart, Inc. exercised the lease option but 
breached the restrictive use covenants contained in the 
lease, the District Court erred in precluding plaintiffs 
from judgment against Husky Oil Company of Dela-
ware by invoking the doctrine of waiver and estoppel. 
Plaintiffs based their causes of action against Husky 
Oil Company of Delaware on the sixth paragraph on 
page 2 of the lease which states: 
uThis lease shall be assignable by the L E S S E E 
without the consent of the L E S S O R provided 
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that LESSEE shall at all times be liable for the 
faithful performance of all the covenants of this 
Lease, and any assignment of the Lease as afore-
said shall not operate to release the LESSEE 
from any of its obligations hereunder." (em-
phasis added) 
Therefore, when the District Court found that Husky 
Oil Company of Delaware's assignee Trailer Mart, Inc. 
breached the lease by operating a trailer and recre-
ational vehicle sales outlet on the premises, the District 
Court erred in not awarding judgment to the plain-
tiffs against Husky Oil Company of Delaware based 
on its contractual liability, especially when Husky Oil 
Company of Delaware did not plead waiver and estop-
pel as an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Clearly the District 
Court erred in finding waiver and estoppel when it 
was not pleaded; see Parowan Mercantile Co. vs. Gurr, 
83 U. 463, 30 P.2d 207 (1934); Brittain vs. Gorman, 
42 U. 586,133 P . 370 (1913). 
P O I N T V I I 
T H E JENSEN VS. OK INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION CASE D I S T I N G U I S H E D . 
Because the District Court confused this Court's 
ruling in the Jensen vs. OK Investment Corporation 
case, supra, with the issues in the present case, plain-
tiffs offer a brief outline of the main differences be-
tween the two cases: 
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1) The Jensen case decided the issue as to when 
a subtenant becomes a lessee in privity of contract with 
the landlord to have standing to exercise a lease option. 
The present case involves the issue of the capacity of 
an executrix to exercise a lease option, and the issue 
of forfeiture for breach of restrictive use covenants con-
tained in a lease. 
2) In the Jensen case, the original lessee OK In-
vestment Corporation disclaimed all interest in the 
lease in favor of its subtenant Trailer Mart, Inc. when 
approached by the landlord for the delinquent rent. 
This disclaimer produced a two party transaction where-
in the subtenant and the lessor were able to negotiate 
an extension of the lease directly. In the present case, 
not only did the original lessee Estate of Max Siegel 
not disclaim all interest in the lease in favor of its sub-
tenant Trailer Mart, Inc.; the Estate of Max Siegel 
filed a counterclaim against the lessors for loss of the 
lease. Therefore, without a disclaimer, a three party 
transaction evolved, wherein the consent of the lessor, 
lessee, and the subtenant were all needed before an 
assignment could bind the parties, see Shell Oil Com-
pany vs. Stiffler, 87 U. 176, 48 P.2d 503, reh, den. 87 
U. 197, 49 P.2d 1150 (1935). Since no evidence was 
presented that the Estate of Max Siegel and George 
and Emily Zeese consented to an assignment of the 
lease to Trailer Mart, Inc., an assignment and exten-
sion of the lease could not arise by a subtenant's reli-
ance upon a leasehold interest. 
3) In the Jensen case, the subtenant Trailer Mart, 
53 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Inc. sent a written offer including additional consid-
eration to extend the lease at an increased rental. The 
Jensens accepted this offer from their subtenant and 
cashed the enclosed check for the delinquent rent and 
nine subsequent checks at the increased rental before 
objecting to their subtenant's inability to exercise the 
lease option. In the present case, the subtenant Trailer 
Mart, Inc. did not present a written claim to the lease 
(Exhibit 12P) until after notice of termination had 
been sent. Nor did Trailer Mart, Inc., the subtenant, 
or the Estate of Max Siegel, the lessee, exercise the 
lease option. 
4) The Jensen case did not involve parties unable 
to contract. The present case concerns an executrix 
having limited powers to contract independent of the 
Probate Court. 
In summary, the Jensen case did not involve a 
breach of a lease or the incapacity of a party to con-
tract. The Jensen case decided solely the issue of 
when a subtenant becomes a lessee in privity of con-
tract with the lessor to have standing to exercise a lease 
option. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs, George and Emily Zeese, submit that 
the District Court erred in finding that Max Siegel 
acted as agent for Trailer Mart, Inc. when he took the 
assignment of the lease in question from Husky Oil 
Company of Delaware,, Plaintiffs further submit that 
the District Court erred in finding that Eva Siegel, 
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Executrix named in the Last Will and Testament of 
Max Siegel, exercised the option to extend the lease 
on behalf of Trailer Mart, Inc. As the assignment, 
Exhibit 6P, indicates, the lease was assigned to Max 
Siegel as an individual. I t subsequently passed into 
the hands of his legal representative, Eva Siegel as 
Executrix of the Max Siegel Estate, upon his death. 
Since the lease was not probated as personal property, 
the lease lapsed and the defendants became month to 
month tenants. Therefore, since the District Court's 
findings are in error, the judgment must be reversed. 
If the findings of Max Siegel's and Eva Siegel's 
"agency" are not in error, the District Court erred in 
precluding plaintiffs from enforcing the restrictive use 
covenants contained in the lease by invoking the doc-
trine of waiver and estoppel—especially when the 
parties agreed in the lease to remedy any breach of 
the covenants within 30 day's notice, and that there 
would be no waiver or forfeiture of the covenants by 
acceptance of rent or otherwise. Nor did defendant 
Husky Oil Company of Delaware even plead the af-
firmative defense of waiver and estoppel! 
v'-This case is also one of first impression in Utah 
and severely affects the tax collection procedures in the 
State of Utah. For this Court to allow a person to 
lease property and then to permit his successors and 
heirs to bypass the Probate Court upon his death will 
circumvent the statutory rules governing the descent 
and distribution of personal property in Utah. Un-
certainty will arise so that creditors will never know if 
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they are dealing with an obligation of an estate or with 
an obligation of parties to a secreted lease. Inequities 
will also result, as in this instance, wherein an execu-
trix acted as agent for a hidden lessee to prevent the 
lessor from enforcing agreed upon restrictive covenants 
governing the use of the property. 
In consideration of the facts and the law presented 
in the foregoing Argument, plaintiffs urge this Court 
to reverse the judgment of the District Court and de-
clare the lease void. Plaintiffs also request that the 
counterclaims of the defendants be dismissed as a 
matter of law, and that the case be remanded for a 
determination of the damages suffered by plaintiffs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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